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Anthony D' Amato 
A T ANY GIVEN MOMENT IN HISTORY, there are hundreds if not thousands of political, cultural, and economic trends that an 
observer can identify. Some of the trends will be short and of no 
consequence, some long but also inconsequential, and many of them just 
"noise," but there will also be a few significant mega trends. A later historian 
has an easy job: she looks back at the visible long' term trends that changed 
the world. But how can we identify the significant mega trends of today? As 
we approach the end of the twentieth century, millenary thinking 
encourages one to try. I will suggest some megatrends that I believe will 
impact most significantly on the future use of force. Yet in contributing to a 
volume that is part of a historic and enduring series, I am troubled by the 
likelihood that a future reader may be interested in my essay only to see 
what later developments blindsided me. Of course, some things could 
possibly happen that would make any such enterprise, not just mine, quite 
obsolete: invasion from another galaxy, conquest by deadly viruses, or more 
benignly, cheaply converting water into energy. But macro,convulsive 
events aside, and with more than customary trepidation, I offer here a 
discussion of some of the megatrends that I see will probably have the 
greatest impact on the future use of force. 
Megatrends in the Use of Force 
The Global Market 
The demise in the former Soviet Union was only the 
most visible effect of a worldwide surge to capitalism and free markets. Are 
there any "undeveloped" nations today? Perhaps there are a few, but nearly all 
nations rightly regard themselves as "developing" or "developed." Former 
political "hot spots" all over the world have cooled down as the people in those 
localities have increasingly realized the foolishness of engaging in political 
fights while their neighbors in peaceful countries are busy accumulating 
wealth. I have in mind South Africa (how else account for the incredible 
dismantling of apartheid?), Northern Ireland, and even the Middle East, which 
is fitfully moving toward accommodation. 
As prosperity spreads, we hear commentators saying that war is 
economically irrational and hence cannot or will not occur. The problem is 
that popular writers were saying the same thing in the years preceding the 
outbreak of World War I. Industrial Europe was humming along in 
1907-1914, trade was flourishing, and wars seemed a thing of the past. Was 
there a difference between those times and today with respect to the outlook 
for war? I can suggest two interrelated differences. 
One is colonization. Prior to the First World War, the European powers, no 
matter how peaceful vis,a,vis each other, were engaged in aggrandizement of 
their empires abroad. Colonial wars were being fought in Africa and Southeast 
Asia even as the home countries appeared peaceable within Europe. Perhaps 
the submerged competition for empire, combined with a continuing taste for 
foreign military adventurism, were long levers propelling the mother countries 
toward war. Looking back on it, it seemed to have been a case of the colonial 
tail wagging the home country dog. 
A second difference concerns convictions about the peace thesis. Although 
it was popular to claim that wars were economically irrational, there were 
perhaps too many skeptics in high places. The skeptics were justified at least in 
believing that it had not been proven that nation A would become richer by 
trading with nation B than conquering and subjugating B. Perhaps colonization 
was the basis for this belief; after all, the major nations were engaged in 
colonization at a time when their home economies appeared to be prospering. 
Although there may not have been any causal connection between 
colonization and prosperity, when two major trends coexist many people 
assume that they are correlated. It was intellectually hard to make a case that a 
nation could be better off without colonies. To be sure, nations without 
colonies such as those that made up the Austro,Hungarian Empire, were 
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thriving prior to World War I, but this could be rationalized as derivative or 
spillover prosperity from colonizers such as France, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. 
Today, in contrast, colonialism has ended. I would like to show by some 
statistics the generally accepted proposition that the peace thesis has been 
proven by the experience of Japan. 
Japan for the last hundred years has been a nation of processors, importing 
raw materials and energy and exporting finished products. Japan's prosperity in 
the processing business was rudely disrupted in the aftermath of World War I, 
when European nations, and eventually the United States, erected high tariff 
barriers. No longer able to sell its products profitably in these two markets, 
Japan was plunged into a severe recession. Control of its economically hapless 
government soon passed into the hands of demagogues and militarists. Their 
agenda was to substitute force for trade: an export market for Japanese goods 
would be created by force in China, to be followed up by forcible control over 
imports from Southeast Asia. The "export" part of the story got off to a good 
start with the immediate conquest of Manchuria, unopposed by the League of 
Nations. But soon the Japanese Army was confronted with sophisticated 
guerrilla tactics in the rest of the vast Chinese empire. It got bogged down in 
China through the rest of the 1930s and for the entire duration of World War 
II. Far from being able to generate a captive Chinese market for Japanese 
products, the only "demand" created was that for weaponry and ammunition 
on the part of the Japanese army-a demand that Japan had to satisfy for free. 
However, it is the "import" side of the story that furnishes the more 
interesting and decisive demonstration of the peace thesis. (The case ofJapan's 
China adventure was not conclusive, in that it could be blamed on military 
shortcomings and poor generalship rather than economic irrationality.) Prior 
to 1940 Japan had to import 83 percent ofits requirements, 40 percent 
of its steel, 80 percent of its oil, and 100 percent of its aluminum. Then it 
invaded Southeast Asia, with immediate and astounding success. Military 
dictatorships were set up in Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, 
the Dutch East Indies, Indochina, Siam, northwest New Guinea, Burma, and 
numerous South Pacific islands. But surprisingly, exports from these newly 
colonized territories to Japan steadily declined from 1942 to 1945, even though 
in 1942-1943 there was only sporadic Allied interference with Japanese 
shipping.1 By 1945 Japanese coal imports were at 8 percent of their 1941 level, 
iron ore at 5 percent, iron and steel at 18 percent, and rubber at 26 percent. 
Also, within the conquered lands themselves, by 1945 tin production in 
Malaya had declined to 24 percent of its prewar level, and in the Dutch East 
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Indies oil had collapsed to 5 percent of its prewar output.2 Military conquest 
had thus contributed both to a sharp reduction in the production of raw 
materials in Southeast Asia and a near,collapse of Japanese imports of these 
raw materials. 
Contrast this situation with that of the present day. The efficacy differential 
of trade over war is such that Japan now imports all the raw materials it wants, 
and the profitability of its processing industry has resulted in an enormous 
capital trade surplus. The lesson learned not only by the Japanese public but 
also by people throughout the world is that everyone can become materially 
richer if their nations trade with other nations instead of trying to conquer and 
control them. It is better for A to trade with B than to own B. 
Trade increases the material wealth of both A and B irrespective of the 
sophistication of their internal economic systems. If A is very rich and B very 
poor, and even if A can produce more efficiently every single item that B can 
produce, the Doctrine of Comparative Advantage nevertheless assures that 
both A and B will become better off by trading with each other.3 As Paul 
Krugman puts it, "[Al country whose productivity lags that of its trading 
partners in all or almost all industries will export those goods in which its 
productivity disadvantage is smallest.,,4 The attraction of trade to A is 
inescapable: it becomes more wealthy itself while driving up the wealth of its 
neighbor B, thus giving B less incentive to prey upon A. 
Despite this reality, history has shown that a war can break out no matter 
how economically irrational it might be. Our baser instincts tend to control our 
actions; our minds, swept along, provide the necessary rationalizations.5 When 
mass emotion has been aroused by appeals to nationalism, "God and Country," 
religious fundamentalism, lebensraum, demonizing one's neighbors, and the 
like, then nations have resorted to war. (A recent example was the soapbox 
orators' appeals in Former Yugoslavia, turning a previously peaceful 
accommodation among Croats, Muslims, and Serbs into mutual hatred and 
civil war. The result was nothing short of economic disaster for all parties, 
which is probably one reason why the nations of the European Union were not 
particularly motivated to intervene.) Emotions such as these cannot be 
trumped by appeals to reason. To block a militant emotion, a countervailing 
emotion must be evoked. 
Emotional Value of Life 
I believe that the most significant megatrend of the twentieth century is the 
sharply increasing value we place on individual human lives. This may be a 
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strange proposition to assign to a century in which more people have been 
killed than ever before (the two world wars, Stalin's and Hitler's genocides, 
etc.) Yet it was largely as a revulsion against those killings that the post-World 
\Var II era witnessed a seachange to international human rights: from the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Convention to the 
recent Rights of the Child Convention (ratified by more States, and more 
quickly, than any treaty in history). But revulsion against killing aside, I think 
the two underlying causes of the increasing value placed on human life are 
population dynamics and television. 
Population Dynamics. The Malthusian doomsayers of the 1970s, such as Paul 
Ehrlich, were right when they said that a geometrically increasing world 
population would render human life very cheap, but they were wrong in 
predicting a population increase. To be sure, one can still make a vivid claim 
that there is a global population explosion. I recently added up demographic 
statistics that show us to be adding to the world's net population, each year, a 
number equal to the combined populations of New York City, Los Angeles, 
Chicago, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, 
Moscow, Bombay, Melbourne, Beijing, Shanghai, and Tokyo. How can the 
world continue to absorb all these new people each year? The world's 
population, now at 5.7 billion, will increase to about 9.4 billion over the next 
fifty years. Are we not already witnessing the cheapening of human life, sadly 
exemplified in genocides in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia, and 
Despite overall population growth, the megatrend goes the other way. For 
the first time in human history the developed nations are experiencing a 
population decline. United Nations statistics compiled in 1995 show that the 
fertility rate of women was equal to or less than the replacement rate (2.1 
children per woman) in countries having 44 percent of the total world 
population. By 2015 it is projected that countries containing of the 
world's population will show a zero or negative replacement rate.6 The lowest 
fertility rates are in Italy (1.24), Spain (1.27), and Germany (1.30). Hong Kong 
(1.32) and Japan (1.48) are surprisingly low, as are Russia (1.53), South Korea 
(1.65), Singapore (1.79), China (1.92), and Thailand (1.94). The United 
States is slightly below the replacement rate (2.05). As the developing 
countries become developed, they will clearly head in the direction of China, 
Thailand, and Japan. Just a decade or two ago China had a population 
crisis-no longer. Among the factors accounting for the population decline are 
women's education (which has been called the world's most powerful 
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contraceptive) and a world decrease in male sperm count (not fully 
understood, but perhaps due to increasing use of pesticides in agriculture and 
medications in animal farming). 
If a Malthusian surplus of people theoretically renders human life cheap, a 
shortage of people is rendering human life increasingly dear. Since I am talking 
about value, anecdotal evidence can be useful. In past centuries and through 
much of the twentieth century, parents could "tolerate" the loss of two or three 
sons in a war; there were more siblings back home. Today there is no tolerance 
for the loss of a single life in war. Many countries are demilitarized, and with the 
increase in democracy throughout the world, public opinion wants nothing to 
do with military adventurism. American foreign policy in Bosnia today, where 
American troops are stationed along with other NATO forces, is dominated by 
a fear of "body bags" returning home. Moreover, the inevitable fatal accidents 
that occur in the course of military training and exercises are now getting 
enormous media attention; a few decades ago they were not even noticed. 
American special forces sent abroad for "police action," such as in Somalia a 
few years ago, are schooled in the doctrine that individual survival comes first: 
don't begin a mission unless you have a safe individual "exit strategy." Gone, 
maybe forever, is the World War II ethic of individual sacrifice to further some 
generalized military policy (though some fundamentalist countries can still 
muster fighting forces under the guise of religious obligation). During the 
Second World War, the number oflives lost to "friendly fire" was not revealed; 
parents were notified that their sons had been killed in action. Today, 
pervasive media coverage makes it difficult to hide a tragic loss due to friendly 
fire, and when any is revealed, public reaction is instantaneously critical. 
Television. First came motion pictures, then television. They have changed 
human life on earth, not just because underdeveloped countries can see how 
people live in developed countries and want to get there too, and not just 
because global news makes faraway places and events seem close and relevant. 
Rather, what is important is the creation by the entertainment media of 
empathy for other people's lives. The stories told on television-the series and 
films-feature the individual, and they use tricks 
and special effects to establish empathy between the viewer and the image of a 
person on the screen. Weare caught up in the lives of these actors in their 
fictional stories, and we share their hopes and fears. Viewers learn to care about 
what happens to these actors in their compelling dramas. David Hume in the 
eighteenth century discussed the "moral sentiment"-that facility of people to 
sympathize (a better word for his purposes perhaps would have been 
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"empathize") with the inner feelings of others when they recognize the external 
signs of those feelings. A stranger who is obviously in pain can evoke a sort of 
virtual pain in the observer. Of course, Hume knew nothing about moving 
pictures; he lived before the invention even of photography. Perhaps he would 
have been astounded if he could have seen how easy it is for people to 
empathize with motion pictures of other people, even when they know those 
other people are only acting. 
Soldiers, of course, are trained to disregard the human feelings and 
sentiments of the enemy. War propaganda often demonizes enemy 
combatants, downgrading the enemy to a subhuman level. Group values are 
promoted at the expense of individual values. For example, if we look back at 
the movies of the Second World War, we find that most of them feature an 
ensemble ofleading players (in contrast to the superstar of today), and usually 
one of them dies in action in the course of the picture. Although the death is 
temporarily mourned, it is soon overshadowed by the military glory of the 
successful ending. Hollywood did its best to emphasize group values, but it was 
not easy to do. There is an underlying logic of motion pictures and television 
that makes the images and stories most compelling when they portray the 
drama of an individual, empathetic hero. When John Wayne was in a World 
War II movie, he could not die (if he did, the box office would die too). His 
movies suggest an uneasy directorial struggle between group heroics and 
\Vaynish heroics, and somehow his films viewed today seem less realistic as war 
cinema because of his strong presence. 
"Smart" Weapons. The development of "smart" weapons that home in on 
their targets means that the mass and indiscriminate killings of World War II 
are no longer a necessary part of warfare. The number of personnel in national 
army groups, has accordingly decreased; "mobile," "elite," and 
"special forces" units are taking the place of armies, divisions, and regiments. 
The new soldier-more mechanized, trained, and deadly-is correspondingly 
more valuable than his or her historical counterpart. The American 
Hornet, both a fighter (F) and attack (A) aircraft, can carry up to three tons of 
smart bombs and missiles. 
A striking difference between World War II and today is the case of the 
aircraft carrier. In 1940-1945 it was the single most expensive and effective 
weapon, and it was nearly invulnerable. Today its cost and effectiveness are 
still enormous when used against many adversaries; what has changed is 
vulnerability. The U.S. carriers in the Seventh Fleet, shuttling 
opportunistically between the Middle East and the Formosan straits, are a 
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formidable presence in both theatres. Yet the carrier is virtually helpless against 
a nuclear missile attack. A single missile discharged from a submarine many 
miles away can obliterate an aircraft carrier. The carrier is like Goliath, who 
was the most powerful individual of his time and place: although retaining his 
power, he abruptly became vulnerable to David's slingshot. 
It is mostly a historical coincidence that smart weapons have been 
developed at the same time that human life has become more valuable. The 
two trends work hand in hand, but they have very little intrinsic connection. 
Scientists and technicians have always had sufficient motivation to develop 
accurate and smart weapons; they did not need any extra humanitarian 
motives.7 Moreover, there are contrary trends. The same scientists and 
technicians have developed nuclear weapons of unprecedented and 
indiscriminate destruction. But a nuclear missile can be accurate or not, 
depending on its use. It can be thought of as having pinpoint accuracy if 
launched upon an aircraft carrier at sea, while a attack upon a 
city is the antithesis of military accuracy. Another contrary trend is the blurring 
of the distinction between civilian and combatant. Guerrilla fighters who wear 
civilian clothes invite their opposition to attack indiscriminately-as was 
discovered, among other places, in Vietnam. And with extreme perversity, 
guerrillas can turn on defenseless people, as did the Shining Path in Peru in 
recent years. Much of the killing and the setting up of "detention camps" in the 
former Yugoslavia in the 1990s was traceable to the lack of military uniforms or 
insignia on many of the soldiers, a legacy of the effective resistance movements 
in Yugoslavia during World War II. 
Smart weaponry means that governmental officials are not totally safe if they 
initiate war. As a result, wars of international aggression have become 
extremely unlikely. Most wars since World War II have been limited, internal 
wars (Korea, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Yugoslavia) or border disputes. Iraq's attack 
on Kuwait was the anachronism that proves the rule, and even then from 
Saddam Hussein's point of view it was aimed at a territory that he said 
historically belonged to Iraq. Perhaps the most instructive example is, again, 
that ofJapan. Not only is it demilitarized but also it has decided that armies are 
economically wasteful. Recently, as North Korea proceeded to develop a 
nuclear capability, Japan appeared to view the situation with equanimity. The 
United States seemed to be far more worried about nuclear proliferation into 
North Korea than was Japan, even though Japan was nearby and vulnerable. If 
the North Korean government thought tha,t its internal economic problems 
could be solved by diverting scarce resources to achieve a nuclear capability, 
they could have learned from De Gaulle's force de frappe. France's nuclear 
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weapons appear to have done absolutely nothing for France's well being or life 
style; instead, the program has been immensely costly and remains so (as 
France continues to have to bribe the Polynesians to allow an occasional 
nuclear testing program in the South Pacific). France's neighbor Germany has 
achieved greater clout in the European community by not diverting any of its 
manufacturing energy to nuclear weapons. 
Clash of Civilizations? 
Irrational reasons that can impel a nation to war include religion and 
nationalism, which are of course the two most historically important factors 
leading to war. Nationalism can be held with the fervor of religious 
commitment (consider the Rousseauean notion of "civil religion"), yet I think 
that nationalistic wars have peaked in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
It was never an easy matter for governments to stir up their citizens to go to 
war, and now that government elites are looked upon with more distrust than 
ever-coupled with the increasing value accorded to human life-I suspect 
that wars of aggression between nations will become increasingly rare. 
Religion, cutting across national boundaries, is a more likely candidate to 
precipitate international conflict. 
Samuel Huntington identifies the major contemporary civilizations as 
Western, Confucian (Sinic), Islamic, Japanese, Hindu, Latin American, and 
perhaps African.s All of these have a distinctly religious core. His article in 
Foreign Affairs published in the summer of 1993, entitled "The Clash of 
Civilizations?" instantly became a focal point of discussion around the world. 
Perhaps much of the attention accorded to the article was due to the fear 
evoked by the possibility of a military clash between two huge civilizations, 
plunging the world into a genocidal war that could dwarf the first two world 
wars. The problem was that Professor Huntington never defined what he 
meant by" clash." That word can refer ambiguously to encounters ranging from 
the cultural clash of rock music and country and western music, to the religious 
clash of two professors of theology debating alternative interpretations of the 
Dead Sea Scrolls, to the culture shock of Western women visiting 
fundamentalist Muslim countries and seeing obvious signs of female 
subordination to men, to outright military encounters, as among the Croats, 
Muslims, and Serbs in the Former Yugoslavia. 
Professor Huntington followed up his article with a book, whose title, unlike 
that of the article, did not end with a question mark. After considerable 
historical material and various statistical tables, The Clash of Civilizations and 
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the Remaking of World Order ends with a possible scenario of a global war 
breaking out in the year 2010. China claims that it will establish full control 
over the South China Sea; "The Vietnamese resist and fighting occurs between 
Chinese and Vietnamese warships.,,9 The United States dispatches a carrier 
task force to the area. China responds by launching air strikes against the task 
force. Japan sides with China, one thing leads to another, and soon Russia, 
Europe, and "most of Islam" are drawn in to a "global civilizational war." 
Professor Huntington concludes, "If this scenario seems a wildly implausible 
fantasy to the reader, that is all to the good."tO But the first question that a 
reader should ask is not the implausibility of the scenario (after all, there are 
millions of implausible scenarios that people could envision), but how it relates 
to Professor Huntington's thesis. China and Vietnam are part of one 
civilization as defined by Professor Huntington-the Sinic civilization.ll Thus, 
ifhis scenario begins as a conflict between China and Vietnam, it is not a clash 
between civilizations but a clash between two States having the same 
civilization. Such a clash mayor may not occur; indeed, anyone could predict a 
clash between any two contiguous States and be as likely as Professor 
Huntington to be right or wrong. It is surprising that Professor Huntington 
would choose as the linchpin scenario of his book a conflict that has nothing to 
do with the thesis he is advocating. Yet it is not an isolated example of the 
sprawling nature of his thesis. In many previous chapters he recounts clashes 
within civilizations, especially focusing on wars in Islamic countries. The 
recent wars between Iran and Iraq, and between Iraq and Kuwait (and Saudi 
Arabia, ostensibly the next target had Saddam Hussein succeeded in holding 
on to Kuwait), are clearly wars within a civilization. 
There is some plausibility in the idea that if an irrational war is to occur, the 
irrational reason for the war may be rooted in religions or civilizations. 
However, picturing how it is supposed to occur is really the crux of the matter. 
Professor Huntington may have felt the logical imperative to supply at least one 
scenario in his book so as to answer the question of how. But the scenario he 
chose illustrates nothing so much as the poverty of his thesis. The thesis boils 
down to saying that wars can occur within civilizations as well as between 
them. One then has to ask what civilizations have to do with it. 
The Corporate World 
With the accelerating global market, multinational corporations are 
increasing in size and influence. They are not downsizing. Corporate mergers 
and acquisitions throughout the world appear greatly to exceed corporate 
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divestitures and not only for reasons of economic efficiency but also 
because of the increasing separation of owners and managers. Shareholders in 
corporations rarely exercise meaningful control of operations; instead their 
fiduciaries-corporate executives and managers-have a free hand. These 
managers try to hold onto and augment their power, which means, effectively, 
that companies will grow even if growth is not in the economic interest of the 
shareholders. 
Governments, on the other hand, are downsizing. With the decline of 
international wars, they have less justification for taxing their citizens; as tax 
revenues level off or decline, government services are cut back or privatized, 
and as a consequence the pressure for downsizing increases. 
If we compare multinational corporations with governments, we find not 
only that the former are upsizing while the latter are downsizing but we also 
find that many corporations have assets that exceed those of many 
governments. Perhaps the majority of the approximately 190 States in the 
world today do not collect as much as eight billion dollars a year in taxes-the 
net income of General Electric CorporationY Microsoft Corporation, which 
has been in existence for less than a quarter of a century, currently earns $3.5 
billion a year, more than the tax revenues of many States that have been in 
existence for centuriesY There are other considerations useful in comparing 
multinational corporations with government. 
Corporations tend to exert far more power over their employees' daily Uves than 
governments exert over their citizens. (True, an employee can quit her job just 
as a citizen can renounce her nationality, but there is no safe haven in either 
case-one simply goes to the next corporation or the next country.) 
Unlike governments, corporations do not have a specific territory to defend. 
They branch at will throughout the world, setting up offices, factories, service 
centers, etc. More importantly, they establish subsidiaries in many countries. 
Technically a corporation's legal identity is dependent upon its charter in its 
original State of incorporation,14 however, multinational corporations these 
days-in the unlikely event of hostility from the original State of 
incorporation-have the ability to phase out their main office and 
reincorporate in another State. IS Peter Drucker has called attention to the fact 
that multinational corporations are slowly becoming transformed into what he 
calls "transnational corporations.,,16 Whereas a multinational corporation sets 
up subsidiaries that are essentially clones of the parent company, a 
transnational corporation only localizes selling, servicing, public relations, and 
legal affairs; parts, machines, planning, research, financing, marketing, and 
pricing are conducted in specialized locations, so that a given subsidiary in a 
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given country might receive parts from all the other subsidiaries and simply 
assemble the final product locally. Thus, if any government takes over any of 
the subsidiaries, it will take over an essentially worthless operation; the 
corporation will simply cease shipping the component parts to that taken-over 
subsidiary. Drucker says "successful transnational companies see themselves as 
separate, nonnational entities.'!l7 As global financial markets become 
consolidated (twenty-four-hour trading worldwide), there will be less reason 
for US corporations to maintain their US nationality. They may gain a tax 
advantage by moving to a foreign haven, and there might be little loss in 
abandoning their American identity as far as share prices and financial liquidity 
are concerned. 
Unlike governments, corporations are not burdened with social responsibility. A 
government-even the most dictatorial-believes that the welfare of its 
citizens is its responsibility. In contrast, corporations will not take on any social 
responsibility-even as to their own employees-that would result in a loss of 
long-term profitability.ls 
Nearly every corporation has its own security personnel. The number of private 
police personnel employed in the United States greatly exceeds the number of 
public police officers. Private security persons are usually armed and can legally 
use force within their corporate jurisdictions. In addition, there are many 
private companies that lease temporary security persons to corporations to 
police special events. As I walk to my office, I sometimes see a Northwestern 
University police car. It is painted the same colors as a regular police vehicle 
and has Mars lights on its roof. The persons in the car are uniformed like 
regular police and carry weapons. The word "POLICE" is painted on the 
side-and underneath it, in a somewhat smaller font, "NORTHWESTERN." 
The Internet has vastly enhanced the power of corporations, not just because it 
allows them to communicate inexpensively with all parts of their production 
and marketing processes, but because it gives them a new ability which is now 
in its earliest stages. I am talking about the trend toward electronic banking. 
Banks already engage in wire transfers of money, but when corporations start 
doing it among themselves-bypassing banks in the process-the result will be 
to take monetary control out of the hands of governments. A nation-state will 
not much longer be able to block its currency or restrict capital movements. It 
is hard to exaggerate the immense loss of power that governments will 
experience when international monetary transfers are completely privatized. 
Corporations are increasingly outsourcing many of their functions and modes of 
production. They regard themselves as being in the knowledge business, not the 
production business. In addition to advertising, which traditionally has been 
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placed through outside agents, outsourcing includes plants and factories, 
payroll, and most recently employees. Specialized companies with names like 
"Manpower," "Labor Ready," "Account Temps," "Billing Concepts," 
"Catalytica," "Data Processing Resources," "Staff Leasing," and "AccuStaff" 
now provide U.S. corporations with temporary employees who are ready to 
handle just about every function that the corporation used to provide. The 
more functions that corporations outsource, the less vulnerable they are to 
government regulation, unionization, seniority demands, and natural disasters. 
The huge power and confined responsibility of multinational corporations 
lead to the speculation that they, and not necessarily States, may become the 
major warring antagonists of the future. 
A corporation lives on profits. Although the path ofleast resistance toward 
profitability is raising prices, the obstacles on that path are competition and 
substitution by consumers of alternative goods or services.19 A corporation can 
do little about the "substitution effect," but it certainly can spend a great deal of 
its energy combatting competitors. The marketplace prefers that this "combat" 
take the form of increased productive efficiency. But it can also take the form of 
monopolization and destruction of the competitor. Destruction can be 
accomplished by predatory pricing (outlawed by U.S. antitrust statutes, but 
when we are talking globally, there is opportunity for predatory pricing in other 
countries who either do not have antitrust laws or enforce them laxly). 
Monopolization is the preferred route. A company receives a limited term 
monopoly for some important forms of intellectual property such as copyright 
and patents, and an unlimited term for others such as trademarks. Trade 
secrets in many countries receive forms of judicial protection. However, 
intellectual property is a benign form of monopolization, because it strikes a 
legal balance between rewards innovation and temporal limits on that 
innovation. 
The more crude form of monopolization is by use of stealth and force. 
Industrial spying is big business. Manufacturing processes, trade secrets, and 
software engineering are some valuable industrial targets for corporate 
"intelligence" operations. However, we have not yet seen the overt use of force 
against competitors on any significant scale, even though recently there have 
been numerous accounts of specific assassinations of corporate executives and 
entrepreneurs in Russia and in some of the other States of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States. 
What if someday corporations add military force to their outsourcing, and 
organizations spring up with names such as "Mercenaries, Inc.," "Battle 
Ready," "Armada Resources," "Guerrilla Temps," and "Spy Concepts"? These 
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outfits would do dirty work for hire. One such organization already exists, 
although so far it refuses to be hired by private corporations and limits its 
services to governments. The organization, based in South Africa, is called 
"Executive Action.',zo 
Corporate "greed" and "rapacity" in the business "jungle" are part of 
everyday language. As business enterprises exceed governments in assets and 
power around the globe, will we begin to see forceful manifestations of these 
terms? The history of the British East India Company may shed some light on 
the matter. For two and a half centuries it enriched its stockholders, and its 
tariffs fueled the expansion of the British parliament from a small organization 
to a powerful central governmentY The company was founded on December 
31, 1600, by a charter from Queen Elizabeth that gave it exclusive trading 
privileges with the East Indies. Apart from being allowed to arm its vessels, the 
company was barred from engaging in any forms of conquest or colonization. 
However, as the years passed, it increasingly got involved in the use of force. At 
first force was used defensively-against depredations from Portuguese and 
Dutch vessels and outposts in India and the Orient. But then, under the theory 
that the best defense is a strong offense, the British East India Company 
increasingly engaged in military campaigns, becoming a colonial arm of the 
British government until its entire absorption by that government in 1857. 
Perhaps if there had been no competition from Portugal and Holland the 
picture would have been a peaceful one of trade and enrichment. But 
competition is endemic in business. Standard economic theory says that "pure" 
competition forces prices down to the point where profits vanish entirely. 
Hence, competition is an threat to the continued existence of 
corporations. 
The military clashes between the British and Dutch East India companies in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Southeast Asia were made 
possible by the weakness of local governments in that area. Today, in most 
parts of the world, governments are still strong enough to deter corporations 
from resorting to armed force in the battle against their competitors. But as 
governments downsize and corporations become more powerful, the situation 
may change. 
If the situation changes, will "international law" apply to intercorporate 
warfare? Or will there be a new "intercorporate law," analogous to 
international law? If such law arises, who will enforce it? Perhaps the largest 
multinational corporations will set up a global board of governors with enough 
power to prevent smaller competitors from using force, thus insulating 
themselves from competition. But the new law they promulgate and enforce 
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may not be informed, as international law is, by elementary notions of morality. 
International law reflects many moral norms (e.g., military humanitarian law, 
the laws of war, laws of state responsibility for torts, and the general principle of 
the equality of states), but perhaps that is because the that have 
generated that law are themselves the moral repositories of their citizens. 
Corporations, as I have mentioned, have no moral imperative; their goal is 
simply to make profits. Hence, a world intercorporate law may be morally 
barren, unequal in its application, dictated from above, and unchangeable from 
below. \Y/e could be heading toward world fascism. I hope I am wrong, but it 
doesn't hurt to be vigilant. 
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